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Abstract 
 
Wages and their effect on labour supply are not only an important subject for labour 
economists who aim at measuring substitution and income effects. Additionally, the 
government is interested in the impact of policy changes on the labour market and companies 
would like to know if it is possible to increase labour supply and especially productivity by 
increasing the wage rate. This paper introduces a dynamic version of the traditional model of 
labour supply and presents model extensions and the underlying behavioural assumptions 
arising from empirical findings, psychology and neuroscience. It evaluates findings and 
behavioural assumptions derived so far.  
None of the contributions investigated in this work is entirely free from criticism. The 
problem of analysing a comprehensive model of labour supply on the one hand, is the scarcity 
of suitable subjects to investigate and on the other hand, the individuality of each subject 
observed. With this work a critical analysis of existing research on labour supply decisions is 
provided. This shall contribute to motivate and ease future research in this area which has to 
take these problems into account. 
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1. Introduction 
Wages and their effect on labour supply are not only an important topic for labour economists 
who aim at measuring substitution and income effects. Additionally the government is 
interested in the impact of policy changes on the labour market and companies would like to 
know if it is possible to increase labour supply and especially productivity by increasing the 
wage rate. Considering the theory of the competitive labour market, the market clears at a 
wage rate which is equal to the marginal revenue product of labour. As a result, involuntary 
unemployment falls to zero. However, this is not always the case; firms for example 
voluntarily pay above market clearing wages. If we assume that firms predominantly aim at 
maximising profits, then the generous wage must have a positive effect on workers 
productivity which outweighs the extra wage costs.  
The neoclassical model of labour supply predicts that worker work harder (comprising 
longer hours) when there is a temporary wage increase, and increase their leisure time in 
times of low wages. The standard theory can best be tested in “an environment in which 
workers are free to choose when and how much to work and in which there is a salient 
relation between their effort and their income” (Goette, Huffman and Fehr 2003). This work 
critically reviews existing research on intertemporal labour supply decisions. The authors of 
these contributions question the validity of the traditional labour supply model. Furthermore, 
they test different theoretical extensions of the labour supply model against their findings. 
These extensions are predominately guided by behavioural regularities observed in the labour 
market or even studied in neuroscience. There seems to be consent among most of these 
researchers that a model with reference dependent preferences is the best one in predicting the 
empirical findings correctly. This model assumes that workers work towards a daily income 
goal and that they would experience psychological costs if they do not reach their target.  This 
paper not only analyses behavioural models tested by the researches within their contributions 
but also suggests models which have not been evaluated against the empirical findings.  
The paper is organized as follows. The second chapter introduces a dynamic version of 
the traditional model of labour supply. In the third chapter model extensions and the 
underlying behavioural assumptions arising from empirical findings, psychology and 
neuroscience will be presented. The last paragraph of chapter three evaluates findings and 
behavioural assumptions derived so far. Finally, the last chapter is the conclusion. 
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2. The traditional model of labour supply 
The static labour supply model analyses the labour supply decision at a specific point in time. 
It is used to estimate the change in labour supply by comparing two static equilibrium 
situations. In the case of a wage change analysts would estimate the labour supply before the 
change and afterwards and then they compare the outcomes. 
 
Figure 1: Dynamic model of Labour supply1 
A dynamic labour supply model on the other hand, as the one presented in figure 1, is 
interested in how a wage change does affect labour supply throughout the whole life or 
through an episode of an individual’s life. That’s why this model is also called life-cycle 
model of labour supply. The standard life cycle model assumes that an individual maximises 
the following intertemporal utility function: 
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By choosing to participate in the labour market and to work a specific number of hours an 
individual maximises his/her life time utility (1)2 which is subject to a budget constraint (2). 
Life time utility depends on the consumption opportunities )(tx  and the amount of leisure 
)(tF  at each point in time. The decision is influenced by individual characteristics )(tR  and 
unobserved individual heterogeneity )(t  which affect the labour supply decision. It is 
assumed that the length of the planning horizon, period t=0 until K is known by the 
individual. Since people prefer consumption today compared to consumption in the future, 
they discount future consumption at a subjective interest rate s. The budget constraint 
                                                 
1 Franz (2003). 
2 It is an additive and separable utility function. 
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constitutes the persons nominal wealth, A(0), at time t = 0 and the discounted difference 
between the earned wage income and the consumption expenditure.3 This expression is 
assumed to be equal or greater than 0. The solution to the constrained maximization problem 
(1) and (2) can be observed in figure 1. The interesting question to be answered by this model 
is how a temporary increase in the wage rate changes the labour supply decision. The 
horizontal line AA’ constitutes the reservation wage of the individual which depends on the 
market wage of each time period observed. As long as the market wage )(0 tW  is above the 
reservation wage, the individual will participate in the labour market. Between period 5t  and 
6t  an anticipated wage increase 
_
W occurs which leads to an increase in the reservation wage 
from AA’ to BB’. This is because the higher wage decreases the marginal utility of wealth. 
Furthermore the model predicts a decrease in hours of work during periods not affected by the 
wage increase. The overall hours worked during the period t = 0, 1, 2…, K is, however 
ambitious. Without further information about the size of the income and substitution effect it 
is not possible to determine whether hours of work over the life cycle increase or decrease. 
The dynamic labour supply model presented above predicts that an anticipated temporary 
increase in the wage should be followed by a simultaneous increase of labour supply. This 
reasoning follows because such a wage increase does not affect lifetime wealth but raises the 
current price of leisure.4 The outcome might be less clear for unanticipated wage increases 
which affect lifetime wealth. Even in this case, however, the wealth effect should be tiny for a 
truly transitory wage change and therefore the labour supply elasticity should be positive. 
3. Model extensions and behavioural assumptions 
The following paragraphs, present empirical and experimental evidence which question the 
validity of the traditional labour supply model. The authors of these contributions test 
different theoretical extensions of the labour supply model against their findings. Their 
models are predominately guided by behavioural regularities observed in the labour market or 
even studied in neuroscience. A summary including the results and limitations of the 
contributions considered in the next paragraphs can be found in the Appendix. 
3.1 Dynamic labour supply model with additive and separable utility 
The dynamic labour supply model with an additive and separable utility function has been 
introduced in the previous chapter. This is the model which’s validity has been questioned by 
                                                 
3 R is a constant interest rate, H(t) the hours of work, W(t) the wage per hour, x(t)*P(t) the consumption 
expenditure. 
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several economists. It predicts that an anticipated temporary increase in the wage should be 
followed by a simultaneous increase of labour supply. By thinking about this prediction 
intuitively there seems to be no reason to believe that individuals might react differently. In 
all studies being discussed in this work, the wealth effect is negligible because of the 
temporary nature of the shocks or the empirical specification. Therefore the income effect is 
marginal or not present and the substitution effect should be positive during the time of the 
wage increase. This is because a wage increases raises the current price of leisure which leads 
to an intertemporal substitution of work for leisure.  
Support for this model comes from Oettinger (1997, 1999) who analysed the 
participation decision of stadium vendors. He concludes that vendors are more likely to 
participate if expected earnings of the respective game are high. Faber(2005) also did not find 
a deviating behaviour while analysing the stopping behaviour of New York taxicab drivers. 
He assumes that a driver at a given point in his shift compares his utility if he stops working 
with his expected utility continuing to work. Both studies, however, do not allow making 
inferences on the overall labour supply. The analysis by Faber (2005) does not reflect the 
participation decision and the one by Oettinger (1997, 1999) does not allow reliable 
inferences about effort per game (Fehr and Goette 2005). Fehr and Goette (2005) themselves 
find a positive overall labour supply response in their field experiment at a bicycle messenger 
firm. Nevertheless, they detected forces which worked against the intertemporal substitution 
effect. The data provided the opportunity to study the effort decision and the decision to work 
a specific shift, as a response to a temporary wage increase. They found that the large positive 
effect on labour supply was exclusively driven by the increase in the number of hours 
worked. The labour supply elasticity of work effort on the other hand decreased in response to 
the wage increase. Here we are at a point where the traditional labour supply model is no 
longer able to explain the behaviour of the working population. Fehr and Goette (2005) tested 
two extensions of the labour supply model to find the one which would go conform to their 
data. These are the labour supply model with non-separable utility and a rational choice 
model with reference dependent preferences. 
3.2 Labour supply model with non-separable utility 
Employees who decide to work longer hours or more periods, as the bicycle messengers in the 
field experiment by Fehr and Goette (2005), may rationally decide to reduce effort per hour 
(per shift). The model with non-separable utility accounts for the fact that last periods effort 
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raises this period’s marginal disutility of effort. The model allows for the fact that workers 
who work more shifts will reduce their effort per shift. Therefore, the model is consistent with 
evidence form the bicycle messenger behaviour (Fehr and Goette 2005). The other model 
employed, the rational choice model with reference dependent preferences (RDP-Model), 
however, does also predicts the outcome derived in the experiment correctly.5 Why Fehr and 
Goette (2005), nevertheless, prefer the RDP-Model will be described in the discussion of the 
respective model below.  
Goette and Huffman (2005, 2006) also consulted the labour supply model with non-
separable utility to explain their findings. They investigated the within-day changes of effort 
decisions as a response to a wage increase for bicycle messenger working for the company for 
some time. They found that messengers work diligent early the day but relax later on. They 
call the analysed model a fatigue model. This is just another form of saying that high effort 
early in the day increases the marginal costs of effort later on. Again, utility is not separable 
the difference to the first paragraph of this section is that they study two versions of this 
model. The first one is fatigue with recovery which implies that after one period of leisure 
time, the individual recovers and proceeds with lower marginal costs in the next. The other 
version is fatigue without recovery, where a stock of fatigue is build up. Both models would 
predict an increase in effort along the whole day, hence not reflecting the decrease in effort 
later in the day.6 Given that the marginal cost of effort is sufficient convex, however, it could 
be that effort decreases as time goes by. Goette and Huffman (2005, 2006) therefore conclude 
that the fatigue model has not proved satisfactory in explaining their results. In the next 
paragraphs the already mentioned RDP-Model will be outlined. 
3.3 Reference Dependent Preferences (RDP-Model) 
Workers may have a daily income target which serves as a reference point. It is assumed that 
loss avers individuals will experience an additional psychological cost, if they fall short of 
their target. The marginal utility of an additional Euro earned below the target is therefore 
higher than the marginal utility above the target. Paying workers temporarily higher wages 
would mean that the reference point is reached earlier, reducing the marginal utility of income 
and inducing workers to provide less effort.  
A daily income target has been seen as a plausible explanation of employee’s 
behaviour in the studies by Fehr and Goette (2005) and Goette and Huffman (2005, 2006) 
who concentrated on bicycle messengers as well as for taxicab drivers as studied by Camerer 
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et al. (1997). Bicycle messengers it is argued, are aware of how much money they earn from 
each completed delivery since they keep the receipts form each delivery they did on a shift. In 
a similar situation are taxicab drivers, so that both occupational groups may use an income 
target as a commitment device. This rule of thumb may turn out to be easier than attempting 
to keep track of how much money they earned over several shifts. Considerable research does 
exist “which suggests that people ‘bracket’ decisions narrowly” hence they isolate “decisions 
from the entire stream of decisions they are embedded in” (Read and Lowenstein 1996 in 
Camerer et al. 1997). A further reason brought about in favour of income targeting is that it 
helps workers to overcome a natural tendency to “shirk” that arises from a high marginal 
disutility of effort (Fehr and Götte 2005).  
Camerer et al. (1997) estimate a model using data from daily wages and work hours of 
city cabdrivers in New York. They find a significant negative wage elasticity of hours 
worked. As a result of their estimates and interview with taxi fleet owners they conclude that 
driver “drive as if they have an income target, when they get near the target, the probability of 
quitting for the day rises sharply.” The findings of Camerer et.al (1997) ,however, have been 
questioned by several authors who argue that the econometric approach applied does not 
produce the true estimates of the wage elasticity. I will only mention two of the main 
criticisms. The first one is the endogeinity of the wage which, if not controlled for leads to a 
downward bias of the estimates as shown by Oettinger (1999). Secondly, fare opportunities 
vary dramatically and unpredictably over the day, thus it makes little sense to characterize a 
day by the average income per hour, as Camerer et. al. (1996) did. (Faber 2005).  
Above it has been assumed that, especially, loss avers individuals exhibit additional 
psychological cost, if they fall short of their target. Exactly this reasoning brought Fehr & 
Goette (2005) to the idea of using a lottery to find out the degree of loss aversion of their 
experimental subjects.7 It turned out that the degree of loss aversion contributed significantly 
to the negative effort elasticity. These findings let them to conclude that the RDP-Model is 
more appropriate to explain a negative effort elasticity of their bicycle messengers than the 
model with non-separable utility.  
A slightly different interpretation of the RDP-Model has been put forward by Goette 
and Huffman (2006). They claim “that workers on a piece rate are psychologically motivated 
to reach a daily income target on top of their purely financial motives to exert effort.” They 
back up their claim by referring to recent evidence from psychology and neuroscience which 
                                                                                                                                                        
6 For the derivation of the model please see Goette and Huffman (2006). 
7 Bicycle messengers. 
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detected affect to be a source of generating this kind of behaviour. The within-day effort 
decision for their bicycle messengers has been modelled based on the interaction of two 
neural systems. The cognitive system is the one which leads to a behaviour as predicted by 
the standard labour model and the second is the affective system. This evolutionary older 
system induces people to work towards a goal and directs people to behave loss avers. Goette 
and Huffman (2006) found this version of the RDP-Model to be in line with their empirical 
observation that messengers work harder in early hours and less hard later on. 
Every model presented under the headline of reference dependent preferences so far has 
assumed that the reference point is an exogenous variable. In other words, the income target 
of a worker does not change regardless of what happens. Köszegi and Rabin (2004) 
developed a model in which the reference point is endogenously determined. For taxi cab 
drivers this would mean that “a fully anticipated increase in the morning wage leaves the 
driver on average equally far from” his “target in the middle of the day and hence does not” 
effect his “willingness to continue work” (Köszegi and Rabin 2004). If this wage increase in 
the morning would instead be unexpected, the probability of a driver to continue work in the 
afternoon would decline. There is already evidence that this model does not fit each dataset. 
The wage increase in Goette and Huffman (2005, 2006) for instance is fully anticipated by the 
bicycle messengers; hence their reference income should be adjusted upwards. Therefore the 
effort decision ought to be the same as before the wage increase. It is not clear how many 
days after the wage increase were considered within their econometric specification. The 
intuition stands to reason that the reference income would at least adjust after workers have 
got used to earning a higher wage rate. 
3.4 Evaluation 
Dickinson (1999) points to the limitation of models which treat the choice of hours of work or 
the participation decision as the only variable of interest, when in fact many workers also 
make a calculated decision about the intensity or effort with which they work. In a controlled 
laboratory experiment8 Dickinson (1999) extends the classical model by allowing for a dual 
labour supply choice, namely hours of work and work effort. His results show that 65 per cent 
of the subjects displayed negative substitution effect on work effort. Furthermore 14 out of 26 
subjects show a negative income effect which implies that on the job leisure9 is a normal 
                                                 
8 His subjects earned a piece-rate for each paragraph typed containing no more than five errors. On three days, 
on average two hours a day, they participated in the experiment. At the second day the pay rate either decreased 
or increased. This change was an unanticipated change for the subjects. 
9 Examples for on-the-job leisure are coffee breaks, or staring out of the window. On the job leisure can also be 
interpreted as shirking or putting less effort into work.  
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good. Unfortunately his work does not allow reconstructing if the subjects with a negative 
(positive) substitution effect on effort also have a positive (negative) substitution effect on 
hours. Hence conclusions about behavioural patterns like income targeting or quitting work 
early because high effort leads to tiredness are not possible. Since, for reasons mentioned 
above, future research should concentrate on both, the hours decision and effort decision I am 
going to evaluate only the most recent research which does comply to this requirement. The 
only contributions considered in this work which analyse labour supply in this way is the 
work by Dickenson (1999) himself, the field experiment by Fehr and Goette (2005) and to a 
certain extent the research by Goette and Huffman (2005, 2006). All three contributions, 
however, have their limitations. Dickenson’s work for example does not allow making any 
assumptions about underlying behavioural patterns. Future research could use the data 
collected by Dickenson and then analyse them to overcome this shortcoming. The 
contribution by Fehr and Goette (2005) researches the behaviour of bicycle messengers with 
respect to participation and effort decisions whereby the effort decisions are aggregated to the 
day. The result is that messengers choose to work more shifts in response to a temporary 
wage increase but exert less effort during each shift. The theoretical model fitting this 
behaviour is on the one hand the model implying that workers who choose to work longer 
hours rationally choose to reduce effort per shift. On the other hand stands the RDP-Model 
which is favoured by the authors.  
It is, however, not clear from their work if a shift constitutes a fixed number of 
working hours or if there is room for messengers to quit early. Should there be some 
flexibility of choosing working hours, it would be interesting also to analyse the hours 
working decision. Nevertheless their research could be extended to include within-day effort 
decisions as suggested and applied by Goette and Huffman (2005, 2006). Goette and Huffman 
(2005, 2006) are able to infer that a wage increase leads to an increase in effort early in the 
day but to a reduction of effort in later hours. The behavioural model fitting these findings it 
is argued is the RDP-Model. The idea that effort ceases during the day as a result of fatigue 
has been rejected on grounds of the positive effort response predicted by the theoretical 
model. Additionally, Goette and Huffman (2003) conducted a survey among 114 bicycle 
messengers which reveals that an income target is predominant for most of the messengers 
(Goette and Huffman 2003 in Lorenz, Goette and Fehr 2003).  
Goette, Huffman and Fehr (2003) point out that, “in particular, the RDP-Model can 
explain why higher financial incentives make workers more likely to show up for work, but at 
the same time can cause them to put in less effort on the job.” This, however, would also be 
9 
the result of the shirking model derived by Becker and Stigler (1974). In this model 
companies have to set wages such that shirking can be prevented. Workers themselves 
compare on the one hand the expected wage (utility) in the case they do not shirk and the 
expected wage they would receive if they shirk whereby there is a certain probability that 
shirking will be detected. The probability to detect shirking would intuitively be higher if the 
worker responds to a wage increase by showing up later or quitting work earlier. An effort 
reduction during the day, however, is hardly observable by the firm. 
Nevertheless, it might be reasonable to quit work early if one has supplied high effort 
early in the day instead of reducing effort for the rest of the day. In the research by Goette and 
Huffman (2005, 2006), however, the hours decision seems only of minor interest and it is not 
clear, if the reduction in effort results from being less ambiguous at the end of the day or from 
quitting early. This is the result of their econometric specification defining the dependent 
variable ‘the daily hourly labour supply’ as ‘hourly revenues’. If the messenger takes a long 
break which lasts at least one hour during his shift, the labour supply would be set to zero in 
the same way as if he quit for the day.10 Therefore it could also be possible that messengers 
reduce their hour’s labour supply instead of reducing effort towards the end of the workday. If 
it were indeed the case that messengers do quit early as a response to high effort at the 
beginning of their shift there exists an alternative model besides the RDP-Model which is 
promising in explaining the messengers labour supply decision.  
This is the contribution by Chung-cheng (2003) which treats working hours and work 
effort as distinct variables in an efficiency wage model. By using a modified shirking model 
of Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984), he shows that a wage increase leads to two direct substitution 
effects that motivate workers to provide more effort and hours. Intuitively in the absence of 
an income effect, a higher wage rate increases the relative attractiveness of spending time at 
the workplace to off-the-job leisure as well as of spending time working to on-the-job leisure 
(shirking) (Chung-cheng 2003). Greater effort increases the marginal disutility of spending 
time at the workplace hence the worker reduces his hours spend on-the-job. If this cross 
substitution effect is large, the hourly labour supply may decrease in response to a wage 
increase. This model does not assume that individuals have something like a daily income 
target but rather that exerting effort is associated with high costs, similar to the fatigue model 
presented earlier. 
                                                 
10 Messengers have a typical shift of 5 hours on-duty, in which they also actively deliver Sendungen and the 
maximum workday is seven hours. This could explain why they reduce effort later in the day while they would 
prefer to quite even earlier. They are constrained by their shifts and not completely free to choose hours of work. 
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4. Conclusion 
Empirical evidence on labour supply decisions of workers following a wage increase is 
mixed. There are authors like Oettinger (1997) and Faber (2005) who find support for the 
traditional labour supply model predicting labour supply to increase in response to a wage 
increase. Others, eg. Camerer et al (1997), Fehr and Goette (2005), Goette and Huffman 
(2005, 2006), find work effort to decrease as soon as a daily income target has been reached. 
Increasing a workers wage implies that a worker reaches is income goal earlier, reducing 
effort afterwards. Köszegi and Rabin (2004) suggest a model in which reference incomes are 
endogenous. Meaning that a fully anticipated increase in the wage leads to an adjustment of 
the reference income upwards, leaving the individual equally far from his income target as 
before the wage increase. This model, however, is not supported by all of the findings 
outlined above. 
In explaining their results, be it the decrease of effort of bicycle messengers or the 
reduced number of hours worked by taxicab drivers; all authors favour the income target 
model with a fixed reference point as opposed to the fatigue model. Additionally there seems 
to be consent that labour supply decisions can only be reliably analysed if taking into account 
the hours (alternatively participation decision) as well as the effort decision of workers. While 
the last point is indisputable, in my opinion, the jury is still out on the behavioural explanation 
of these findings. The RDP-Model should not be taken as sole model being able to explain all 
the empirical findings. I have shown that fatigue as an explanation should not be abandoned 
completely since the formulation by Chung-cheng (2003) would also be able to predict such 
outcomes. There needs to be more evidence as the one by Fehr and Goette (2005) who have 
shown that individuals who are loss avers also act as if they have a reference income in mind. 
An interesting idea for future research would be to replicate the laboratory experiment by 
Dickenson (1999) in which it should be possible to control for most of the criticisms 
mentioned in this work.  
None of the contributions investigated in this work is entirely free from criticism. The 
problem of analysing a comprehensive model of labour supply on the one hand, is the scarcity 
of suitable subjects to investigate and on the other hand, the individuality of each subject 
observed. Effort is difficult to observe and if it is feasible, it can only be monitored for a tiny 
group of occupations such that a generalization from these findings is not possible.  With this 
work I have provided a critical analysis of existing research on labour supply decisions. This 
shall contribute to motivate and ease future research in this area which has to take these 
11 
problems into account. For the conclusion it remains to say that it is not yet possible to give 
any founded advice to companies of how to increase work effort of each individual employee. 
12 
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6. Appendix 
 
Author Investigation of Antici-
pated* 
Results Interpretation Limitations 
Camerer et. al. 
(1997) 
Hours decision of New 
York taxicab drivers 
Partly Negative elasticity of 
labour supply 
Income targeting 
(Reference dependent 
preferences) 
- endogeinity of the wage 
- characterizes a day by the 
average income despite sizable 
wage variation within the day 
- day to day variation small 
- effort decision neglected 
Faber (2005) Stopping decision of 
New York taxicab 
drivers 
Yes Increase in expected 
earnings raises the 
probability of 
participation 
In line with 
neoclassical labour 
supply theory 
- effort decision neglected 
Oettinger (1997) Participation and effort 
decision of stadium 
vendors 
Yes Increase in expected 
earnings raises the 
participation as well as 
the effort decision 
In line with 
neoclassical labour 
supply theory 
- relies on an untestable 
assumption about the form of 
the production function 
mapping unobserved effort into 
observed earnings 
Oettinger (1999) Participation decision of 
stadium vendors 
Yes Increase in expected 
earnings raises the 
probability to 
participate 
In line with 
neoclassical labour 
supply theory 
- effort decision neglected 
Dickenson (1999) Effort and hours 
decision in a laboratory 
experiment 
No Subject partly display 
negative substitution 
effects (SE) on effort 
and/or hours of work 
Behavioural 
interpretation not 
possible 
- does not allow to reconstruct 
if the same subjects displaying 
a negative SE on effort also 
have a negative SE on hours 
Fehr & Goette 
(2005) 
Shift and effort decision 
of bicycle messengers 
Yes Choose to work more 
shifts but exert less 
effort per shift 
Reference dependent 
preferences 
- no within day effort decision 
- hours vs. shift decision (hours 
decision constrained by shift?) 
Goette & Huffman 
(2005, 2006) 
Within-day effort 
decision of bicycle 
messengers 
Yes Effort increases early in 
the day but reduction of 
effort in later hours 
Reference dependent 
preferences (2006: 
affective vs. cognitive 
system) 
- no distinction between effort 
reduction during the day and 
quitting for the day 
- hours vs. shift decision? 
Figure 2: Summary of studies on intertemporal labour supply 
*wage increase anticipated or not 
